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Abstract 
Distributed denial-of-service attacks on public servers have recently become a serious problem. To 
assure that network services will not be interrupted and more effective defense mechanisms to 
protect against malicious traffic, especially SYN floods. One problem in detecting SYN flood traffic 
is that server nodes or firewalls cannot distinguish the SYN packets of normal TCP connections 
from those of a SYN flood attack. Another problem is single-point defenses (e.g. firewalls) lack the 
scalability needed to handle an increase in the attack traffic. We have designed a new defense 
mechanism to detect the SYN flood attacks. First, we introduce a mechanism for detecting SYN flood 
traffic more accurately by taking into consideration the time variation of arrival traffic. We 
investigate the statistics regarding the arrival rates of both normal TCP SYN packets and SYN flood 
attack packets. We then describe a new detection mechanism based on these statistics. Through the 
trace driven approach defense nodes which receive the alert messages can identify legitimate traffic 
and block malicious traffic by delegating SYN/ACK packets.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
On the Internet, a distributed denial-of-service 
(DDoS) attack is one in which a multitude of 
compromised systems attack a single target, thereby 
causing denial of service for users of the targeted 
system. The flood of incoming messages to the target 
system essentially forces it to shut down, thereby 
denying service to the system to legitimate users. An 
attempt to make a computer resource unavailable to 
its intended users. Although the means to, motives for 
and targets of a DoS attack may vary, it generally 
comprises the concerted, malevolent efforts of a 
person or persons to prevent an Internet site or service 
from functioning efficiently or at all, temporarily or 
indefinitely. It has been shown that more than 90% of 
the DoS attacks use TCP [1]. The TCP SYN flooding 
is the most commonly-used attack [2]. It consists of a 
stream of spoofed TCP SYN packets directed to a 
listening TCP port of the victim. Not only the Web 
servers but also any system connected to the Internet 
providing TCP-based network services, such as FTP 
servers or Mail servers, is susceptible to the TCP 
SYN flooding attacks. SYN attacks exploits TCP’s 
three-way handshake mechanism and TCP’s 
limitation in maintaining half-open connections.  
 
2. CLASSIFICATION OF DOS ATTACKS 
 There are several general categories of DoS attacks. 
They are classified into three types: bandwidth 
attacks, logic attacks, and protocol attacks.  
 
2.1Bandwidthattacks 
Bandwidth attacks are relatively straightforward 
attempts to consume resources, such as network 
bandwidth or equipment throughput. High-data-
volume attacks can consume all available bandwidth 
between an ISP and site. The link fills up, and 
legitimate traffic slows down. Timeouts may occur, 
causing retransmission, generating even more traffic. 
An attacker can consume bandwidth by transmitting 
any traffic at all the network connection. [17]. A basic 
flood attack might use UDP or ICMP packets to 
simply consume all available bandwidth.  
 
2.2LogicAttacks 
 logic attacks exploit vulnerabilities in network 
software, such as a web server, or the underlying 
TCP/IP stack. Some vulnerability by crafting even a 
single malformed packet. They following are few 
examples logical attacks.Teardrop attacks sending IP 
fragments with overlapping, over-sized, payloads to 
the target machine. Peer-to-peer attacks have found a 
way to exploit a number of bugs in peer-to-peer 
servers to initiate DDoS attacks. Application level 
floods are Various DoS-causing exploits such as 
buffer overflow can cause server-running software to 
get confused and fill the disk space or consume all 
available memory or CPU time. A Nuke is an old 
denial-of-service attack against computer networks 
consisting of fragmented or otherwise invalid ICMP 
packets to the target, achieved by using a modified 
ping utility to repeatedly send this corrupt data, thus 
slowing down the affected computer until it comes to 
a complete stop 
 
2.3ProtocolAttacks 
 The basic flood attack can be further refined to take 
advantage of the inherent design of common network 
protocols. These attacks do not directly exploit 
weaknesses in TCP/IP stacks or network applications 
but, instead, use the expected behavior of protocols 
such as TCP, UDP, and ICMP to the attacker's 
advantage. Examples of protocol attacks  
SYN flood is an asymmetric resource starvation 
attack in which the attacker floods the victim with 
TCP SYN packets and the victim allocates resources 
to accept perceived incoming connection. These are 
classified as Smurf Attack [3], SYN attack, UDP 
Attack, ICMP Attack, CGI request attack, 
Authentication server attack, Attack using DNS 
systems, Attack using spoofed address in ping. 
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2.3.1Smurf Attacks 
   The network floods it with excessive messages in 
order to impede normal traffic. It is accomplished by 
sending ping requests (ICMP echo requests) to a 
broadcast address on the target network or an 
intermediate network. The return address is spoofed 
to the Victim’s address 
 
2.3.2UDP Attacks 
Using UDP for denial-of-service attacks is not as 
straightforward as with the TCP.The UDP flood 
attack can be initiated by sending a large number of 
UDP packets to random ports on a remote host. Thus, 
for a large number of UDP packets, the victimized 
system will be forced into sending many ICMP 
packets, eventually leading it to be unreachable by 
other clients. The attacker may also spoof the IP 
address of the UDP packets. 
2.3.3SYN Flood Attack 
A SYN flood is a form of denial-of-service attack in 
which an attacker sends a succession of SYN requests 
to a target's system. When a client attempts to start a 
TCP connection to a server, the client and server 
exchange a series of messages which normally 
working the client requests a connection by sending a 
SYN (synchronize) message to the server. The server 
acknowledges this request by sending SYN-ACK 
back to the client. The client responds with an ACK, 
and the connection is established. This is called the 
TCP three-way handshake, and is the foundation for 
every connection established using the TCP protocol. 
This is a well known type of attack and is generally 
not effective against modern networks. It works if a 
server allocates resources after receiving a SYN, but 
before it has received the ACK. 
 
 
3. PREVENTION AND RESPONSE 
3.1 SYN Cache 
In the SYN cache [4] mechanism, the server node has 
a global hash table to keep half-open states of all 
applications, while in the original TCP these are 
stored in the backlog queue provided for each 
application. As a result, the node can have a larger 
number of half-open states and the impact of a SYN 
flood attack can be reduced. 
3.2SYN Cookies 
SYN cookies [5] modify the TCP protocol handling 
of the server by delaying allocation of resources until 
the client address has been verified. This seems to be 
the most powerful defense against SYN attacks. This 
technique used to guard against SYN flood attacks. 
The use of SYN Cookies [15] allows a server to avoid 
dropping connections when the SYN queue fills up. 
Instead, the server behaves as if the SYN queue had 
been enlarged. The server sends back the appropriate 
SYN+ACK response to the client but discards the 
SYN queue entry. If the server then receives a 
subsequent ACK response from the client, the server 
is able to reconstruct the SYN queue entry using 
information encoded in the TCP sequence number. 
3.3Firewalls 
Firewalls  have simple rules such as to allow or deny 
protocols, ports or IP addresses. Some DoS attacks 
are too complex for today's firewalls, e.g. if there is 
an attack on port 80 (web service), firewalls cannot 
prevent that attack because they cannot distinguish 
good traffic from DoS attack traffic. Additionally, 
firewalls are too deep in the network hierarchy. The 
router may be affected even before the firewall gets 
the traffic. Nonetheless, firewalls can effectively 
prevent users from launching simple flooding type 
attacks from machines behind the firewall. 
3.4Switches and Routers 
Most switches have some rate-limiting and ACL 
capability. Some switches provide automatic and or 
system-wide rate limiting, traffic shaping, delayed 
binding to detect and remediate denial of service 
attacks through automatic rate filtering and WAN 
Link failover and balancing. 
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These schemes will work as long as the DoS attacks 
are something that can be prevented using them. For 
example SYN flood can be prevented using delayed 
binding or TCP splicing. Similarly content based DoS 
can be prevented using deep packet inspection. 
Attacks originating from dark addresses or going to 
dark addresses can be prevented using Bogon 
filtering. Automatic rate filtering can work as long as 
fixed the set rate-thresholds correctly and granularly. 
Wan-link failover will work as long as both links 
have DoS/DDoS prevention mechanism [11]. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY  
In the exiting system solution for SYN attack is 
provided only based on SYN packets (i.e., the head of 
the connection) and FIN/RST packets (i.e., the tail of 
the connection) [11]. If the rate of SYN packets is 
much higher than that of FIN or RST packets, the 
router recognizes that attacking traffic is mixed in 
with the current traffic. Attacks can also be detected 
through the number of source addresses [15]. If the 
number of source addresses increases rapidly, the 
current traffic might include attack packets. These 
methods have several problems, however, one of 
which is that they cannot detect attacks until servers 
are seriously damaged or until most of the 
connections are closed. Another is that they may 
mistake high-rate normal traffic for attack traffic 
because they do not take into consideration the 
normal time-of-day variation of network traffic or 
they do so using a non-parametric approach without 
knowing how normal traffic varies. A non-parametric 
approach can detect attacks if there is any variance 
from normal traffic, but require a long time. Attack 
traffic should be identified more accurately and 
quickly by considering the variance of normal traffic. 
So, we propose a new defense mechanism for TCP 
SYN Flooding Attack. 
 
4.1Proposed Defense mechanism 
TCP is a connection-oriented protocol. It uses various 
flags to indicate that a connection is being started or 
ended, or that the data carries a high priority. Many 
attacks are based on altering the TCP flags. Certain 
illegal combinations of TCP flags may be able to help 
packets avoid detection by firewalls or intrusion 
detection systems; other illegal combinations may be 
used to attack the systems. The functional 
specification for TCP is defined in RFC 793. This 
RFC and others define how systems should respond to 
legitimate packets, but they don't explain how 
systems should handle illegal combinations of flags. 
Consequently, different operating systems respond 
differently to illegal flag combinations. Attackers can 
exploit this to determine what operating system a 
device is using. 
At least one of these six flags must be set in each TCP 
packet, each flag corresponds to a particular bit in the 
TCP header. The six flags [6] are 
 SYN (Synchronization) - Initiate a TCP 
connection.  
 ACK (Acknowledgment) - Indicates that the 
value in the acknowledgment number field is 
valid.   
 FIN (Finish) - Gracefully end a TCP 
connection. 
 RST (Reset) - Immediately end a TCP 
connection.  
 PSH (Push) - Tells the receiver to pass on 
the data as soon as possible.  
 URG (Urgent) - Indicates that the urgent 
pointer is valid; often caused by an interrupt. 
Case 1: Detecting by using TCP flags 
Normally connection between client and server are 
take place SYN, SYN ACK, and ACK are used 
during the three-way handshake which establishes a 
TCP connection between the client and the server. 
Except for the initial SYN packet, every packet in a 
connection must have the ACK bit set. FIN ACK and 
ACK are used during the graceful teardown of an 
existing connection. PSH FIN ACK may also be seen 
at the beginning of a graceful teardown. RST or RST 
ACK can be used to immediately terminate an 
existing connection. Packets during the 
"conversation" portion of the connection (after the 
three-way handshake but before the teardown or 
termination) contain just an ACK by default. 
Optionally, they may also contain PSH and/or URG. 
Packets with any other flag combination can be 
classified as abnormal. Here are some of the most 
commonly occurring are 
 SYN FIN is probably the best known illegal 
combination. The SYN is used to start a 
connection, while FIN is used to end an 
existing connection. It is nonsensical to 
perform both actions at the same time. Many 
scanning tools use SYN FIN packets, because 
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many intrusion detection systems did not 
catch these in the past, although most do so 
now. You can safely assume that any SYN 
FIN packets you see are malicious.  
 SYN FIN PSH, SYN FIN RST, SYN FIN 
RST PSH, and other variants on SYN FIN 
also exist. These packets may be used by 
attackers who are aware that intrusion 
detection systems may be looking for packets 
with just the SYN and FIN bits set, not 
additional bits set. Again, these are clearly 
malicious.  
Case 2: Detecting by using port 
There are several other characteristics of TCP traffic 
where abnormalities may be occurred to attackers 
Packets should never have a source or destination port 
set to 0. The acknowledgment number should never 
be set to 0 when the ACK flag is set. A SYN only 
packet, which should only occur when a new 
connection is being initiated, should not contain any 
data.  
Case 3: Detecting by ICMP feedback 
The hacker may send SYN packet to the server using 
some other IP address like 10.1.5.20. Then the server 
receives SYN packet and acknowledges to the 
corresponding IP address. But the client does not 
understand the SYN+ACK packet. And also, if the 
client is in off, the server will not receive the ACK 
packet and then waiting for the reply. 
Our implementation takes place when the server 
replies SYN+ACK, the ICMP messages also added 
with that and it is sent to the client. Our approach is 
used to get the information like whether the client 
receives from SYN+ACK or not. Because, the packet 
is sent from the server to the client via router, hub or 
any other active device. The server then identifies the 
reply from the client and stops sending the message to 
the client and concluded that it is work of a hacker .so 
the server identifies the SYN flooding attack.
 
 
Fig. 1: Detecting by ICMP Feedback 
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Case 4: Detecting by tracing the route 
Another solution is we can trace the route of the 
corresponding message where it is started from. The 
ICMP message can be fixed the last router to send 
original IP address of the router. Now the server can 
check the source IP address and original IP address 
whether it is true or not .So the server identifies the 
SYN flooding attack. In the existing system, there is 
no time computation mechanism for defense but it is 
implemented in the proposed system. This defense 
mechanism is used identify the SYN flooding 
accurately with short time span and less SYN packets  
5. CONCLUSION 
We have developed an active defense mechanism to 
protect against TCP SYN Flood attacks using four 
cases. Our mechanism is based on collaboration 
among defense nodes through the trace driven 
approach. SYN attack is detected by combined 
approach of using TCP flags, port, and ICMP 
feedback and by tracing the route of the source. Our 
defense mechanism will be more robust and efficient 
to detect various SYN flooding attacks. It achieves 
high detection accuracy and short detection time. Our 
future work will be to develop ways of identifying 
attack packets at the hardware level of the system. 
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